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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF GROUP DISAGREEMENT:  
AN  INTRODUCTION 
 




1. Group Disagreement: A Brief Overview 
 
Disagreement is among the most thriving topics in mainstream and social epistemology.1  
The research question responsible for initially launching the epistemology of disagreement as its 
own subfield in the early 2000s can be put very simply: suppose you believe some 
proposition, p, is true. You come to find out that an individual whom you thought was 
equally likely as you are to be right about whether p is true, believes not-p. What should you 
do? Are you rationally required, given this new evidence, to revise your initial belief that p, 
or is it rationally permissible to simply ‘hold steadfast’ to your belief that p with the same 
degree of confidence that you did before you found out your believed-to-be epistemic peer 
disagreed with you? Call this the peer disagreement question.  
 How we go about answering this question has obvious practical ramifications: we 
disagree with people we think are our peers often; knowing what we should do, 
epistemically, would be valuable guidance. But the peer disagreement question is also 
important for epistemologists to understand, theoretically speaking, given that it has direct 
ramifications for how we should understand disagreement itself as a form of evidence.  
Unsurprisingly, responses to the peer disagreement question have fallen into two 
broadly opposing categories: those who think that discovering that an epistemic peer 
disagrees with you rationality requires you to some substantial kind of conciliation2—
perhaps even agnosticism3—and those who think that it does not.4 Interestingly, the past ten 
years or so have shown that--in the close orbit of the peer disagreement question--are a 
range of related and interesting epistemological questions, questions that are perhaps just as 
epistemologically as well as practically significant.5   
Just consider that the peer disagreement question is individualistically framed. It is a 
question about what rationality requires of an individual when they disagree with another 
individual about some contested proposition. Gaining an answer tells us, at most, and in 
short, what individuals should do in the face of epistemic adversity. But we also want to 
know what groups should do in the face of epistemic adversity. For example: what should a 
group---say, a scientific committee--do if it turns out that one of the members on the 
committee holds a view that runs contrary to the consensus?6  
It would be convenient if answering questions about how individuals should 
respond to epistemic adversity implied answers to the interesting questions about how 
groups should do the same. Unfortunately, though, things are not so simple. This is because, 
to a first approximation, the epistemic properties of groups are not, as recent collective 
epistemology has suggested, always simply reducible to an aggregation of the epistemic 
properties of its members.7 If we want to understand what groups should do, rationally 
speaking, when there is internal disagreement among members, or when there is 
disagreement between a group and individuals or groups external to the group, we cannot 
and should not expect to find the answers we need simply by looking to the results social 
epistemology has given us to questions individualistically framed. 
The topic of this volume---the  epistemology of group disagreement---aims to face the 
complex topic of group disagreement head on; it represents the first-ever volume of papers 
dedicated exclusively to group disagreement and to the epistemological puzzles such 
disagreements raise. The volume consists of twelve new essays by leading epistemologists 
working in the area, and it spans a range of different key themes related to group 
disagreement, some established themes and others entirely new. In what follows, we offer 
brief summaries of these twelve chapters, drawing some connections between them where 
appropriate.  
 
2. Overview of Chapters 
 
In general, there are two epistemically significant ways in which intragroup disagreement can 
be resolved, i.e., in which members of a divided group can come to agree to let a certain view 
stand as the group's view: (i) they can deliberate and/or (ii) take a vote. Which is the best 
strategy, and why? In ‘Deliberation and Group Disagreement’, we (Fernando Broncano-
Berrocal and J. Adam Carter) open the volume by exploring the epistemic significance that 
the key difference between deliberative and voting procedures has for the resolution of 
intragroup disagreement: namely, the fact that only deliberation necessarily requires that 
group members communicate with each other and by doing so exchange their evidence. In 
order to make traction on this question, deliberation’s  epistemic effectiveness in resolving 
intragroup disagreement is assessed in some detail with respect to how well, in comparison 
with voting, it promotes (or thwarts the attainment of) a range of different epistemic goals, 
including truth, evidential support, understanding, and epistemic justice. 
Javier González de Prado Salas and Xavier Donato, in their contribution ‘Disagreement 
Within Rational Collective Agents’, are primarily concerned with the question of what a group 
must do to be rational as a group, when members of a group hold disagreeing views. One 
answer that they consider and reject holds that group attitudes are rational if they result from 
the application of appropriate judgment aggregation methods. On the proposal they favour, 
group (epistemic) attitudes are rational insofar as they are formed by responding competently 
or responsibly to the (epistemic) reasons available to the group as a group, where this requires 
the exercise of reasons-responding competences attributable to the group. In developing this 
proposal, González de Prado and Donato defend conciliationism as having an important role 
to play, and offer a positive characterization of group deliberation according to which 
deliberation in collective agents tends to facilitate the achievement of internal agreement, not 
only about what attitude to adopt collectively but also about the reasons for doing so.  
Whereas González de Prado and Donato helpfully show the positive implications of 
conciliationism about group disagreement—in that it offers an optimistic picture of collective 
deliberation as a rational method for intragroup disagreement resolution—, Mattias Skipper 
and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen highlight its shortcomings. In particular, in their chapter ‘When 
Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups’,  Skipper and Steglich-Petersen 
argue that conciliatory responses on behalf of individual group members to intragroup 
disagreement—even if rational qua response types to individual disagreement—can have 
adverse epistemic consequences at the group level.  In particular, as they see it, the problem 
is that such conciliatory responses to an internal disagreement can  frustrate a group’s 
epistemic priorities by changing the group’s relative degree of reliability in forming true 
beliefs and avoiding false ones. Finally, Skipper and Steglich-Petersen suggest a solution to 
this epistemic priority problem that does not imply abandoning conciliationism. 
The next two papers in the volume continue follow suit in investigating the 
relationship between group disagreement and conciliationism, albeit in different ways. In his 
chapter ‘Intra-Group Disagreement and Conciliationism’, Nathan Sheff’s objective is to 
defend a form of conciliationism in the specific context of  intra-group disagreements. 
Conciliationism in this context holds when an individual dissenter finds herself in a 
disagreement with the other members of a deliberative group, the rational response for the 
disagreeing member is lowering confidence in their view. Scheff argues first that (i) intra-
group conciliationism does not enjoy ex ante the intuitive plausibility that ordinary 
conciliationism, viz., individualistically framed, does; but that (ii) difficulties facing the view 
can be overcome when we suitably appreciate, with reference to Margaret Gilbert’s account 
of joint commitment8, the kind of normativity that constrains an individual dissenter in the 
predicament of an intragroup disagreement. In particular, they find themselves epistemically 
responsible for contradictory views: their own view, and that of the group and accordingly 
pulled in contrary directions. In this circumstance, Scheff argues, the rational response is at 
least to lower their confidence in their view. 
 In ‘Bucking the Trend – The Puzzle of Individual Dissent’, Simon Barker, like Sheff, is 
concerned with the predicament of an individual dissenter in her capacity as a group member. 
As Barker observes, there is pressure to suppose that when an individual dissents with 
intragroup members, the greater the number of one’s peers against one, the more significance 
one should afford the disagreement—viz., what he calls the principle of collective superiority. 
At the same time, he notes, discussions of disagreement within collective inquiry have 
maintained that justified collective judgements demand methods of inquiry that permit and 
preserve (rather than eliminate) dissent—viz., a principle that Barker labels epistemic 
liberalism. Taken together, these principles seem to make different and incompatible 
demands, what Barker calls the ‘puzzle of individual dissent’. Barker’s objective in the paper 
is to sharpen this puzzle by tracing out the consequences of rejecting either of the two 
principles jointly responsible for the dilemma, and to assess the significance of the dilemma 
more widely in epistemology.  
The next three papers in the volume engage in different ways with the social and 
power dynamics of group disagreement. In ‘Gender and Group Disagreements’ Mona Simion 
and Martin Miragoli take as a starting point two cases of group disagreement, one involving 
gender discrimination, the other involving the marginalization of racial and religious 
minorities. Both, they argue, feature a distinctive form of epistemic injustice at play, and 
further, that extant views in the epistemology of peer disagreement have difficulties 
accounting for what is defective about these cases. Against this background, Simion and 
Miragoli propose and defend a two-tiered solution to the problem that relies on an externalist 
epistemology and a functionalist theoretical framework. 
Epistemic injustice is also a central theme in Mikkel Gerken’s contribution to the 
volume, ‘Disagreement and Epistemic Injustice from a Communal Perspective.’  Gerken’s 
central focus is on the epistemic pros and cons of disagreement for a community and on how 
the social structure of the community bears on these pros and cons. A central conclusion 
drawn is that disagreement has more epistemic costs at the communal level than is often 
recognized by those who follow Mill’s emphasis on disagreement’s positive social 
significance, and that these epistemic costs often yield epistemic injustice, especially given 
disagreement’s capacity to defeat testimonial warrant. 
 In ‘Group Disagreement in Science,’ Kristina Rolin explores, through the lens of 
scientific dissent,  how relations of power influence perceived epistemic responsibilities. Rolin 
takes as a starting point the widespread view in the philosophy of science that a scientific 
community has an obligation to engage scientific dissent only when it is normatively 
appropriate from an epistemic point of view. One notable line of criticism to this standard line 
maintains that the norms constraining epistemically appropriate dissent are ambiguous. 
Rolin’s objective is to respond to this concern by arguing that even when there is disagreement 
over the interpretation of such norms, a scientific community has a moral reason to respond 
to dissenters. On her favoured approach, there is a norm of epistemic responsibility—both an 
epistemic and moral norm—that defines mutual obligations for dissenters and the advocates 
of a consensus view. 
 The volume’s next two chapters view the epistemology of group disagreement 
through a more formal lens. In ‘Disagreement in a Group: Aggregation, Respect for Evidence, 
and Synergy’, Anna-Maria Asunta Eder seeks to answer the following guiding question: How 
do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they 
have different rational credences in the proposition? One way to settle this question is a 
standard Bayesian method of aggregation, a commitment of which is that the only factors 
among the agents' epistemic states that matter for finding the compromise are the group 
members' credences.  In contrast, Astunta Eder develops and defends a different approach—
one that makes use of a fine-grained method of aggregation—on which the members' rational 
credences are not the only factors concerning the group agents' rational epistemic states that 
matter for finding an epistemic compromise. This method is based on a non-standard 
framework for representing rational epistemic states that is more fine-grained than Standard 
Bayesianism, and which comports with a Dyadic Bayesian framework Astunta Eder has 
defended in previous work.9  
 A different kind of Bayesian approach to group disagreement is explored by Erik J. 
Olsson in his paper ‘Why Bayesian Agents Polarize’. A number of studies have concluded that 
ideal Bayesian agents can end up seriously divided on an issue given exactly the same 
evidence, which suggests that polarization may be rational. But even if this is right, a separate 
question is why do Bayesian agents polarize? Olsson engages with this question in the context 
of the Bayesian Laputa model of social network deliberation, developed by Angere and 
Olsson (e.g., 2017). According to recent work by Pallavicini, Hallsson and Kappel (2018), on 
the Laputa model, polarization arises due to a failure of Laputa to take into account higher-
order information in a particular way, making the model incapable of capturing full 
rationality. Olsson’s objective is to reject Pallavinci et al.’s argument; on his preferred 
assessment, what drives polarization is expectation-based updating in combination with a 
modelling of trust in a source that recognizes the possibility that the source is systematically 
biased. 
 The volume rounds out with two new spins on traditional ways of thinking about 
groups and evidence in cases of (group) disagreement. In her paper ‘The Mirage of Individual 
Disagreement’, Maura Priest argues that a large number of important and long-standing 
disagreements that have typically been understood as between individuals, are actually 
disagreements between collectives. This conclusion marks a departure from orthodox 
thinking about individual disagreement. But, once this is appreciated, she argues, it is easier 
to then appreciate why such disagreements are often long-standing; further, Priest argues,  
many individual disagreements (properly understood as group disagreements) are likely to 
remain unresolved because the relevant parties are not properly motivated by epistemic ends. 
 The volume ends with Nikolaj Nottelman’s paper, ‘A Plea for Complexity’. 
Nottelman’s central aim is to show that the epistemic evaluation of group performance in the 
face of testimony and disagreement is a more complex matter than has so far been explicitly 
acknowledged in the literature. In many cases, he argues, it is far from clear whether our 
evaluations of a group’s responses to testimony are primarily epistemic or moral, and, in the 
latter case, how epistemic standards play into our moral assessment. In addition, Nottelman 
maintains, what count as the relevant criteria of groupness, group membership, and group 
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